On July 9, 2019, the First Department issued a decision in Telx-New York, LLC v. 60 Hudson Owner LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op. 05484, holding that the common interest privilege did not apply to communications relating to a merger, explaining:

The common interest privilege does not apply to the communications at issue, in which plaintiff and a third party collaborated to promote their common interest in closing a merger transaction, because the communications do not relate to litigation, either pending or reasonably anticipated.

An issue that arises in almost all complex commercial litigation is identifying evidence that should be withheld from production in evidence because it is subject to the attorney-client or other privilege. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions regarding the attorney-client, common interest, work product or other privileges or exemptions from production of evidence.

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On June 27, 2019, Justice Borrok of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Suratwala v. Gandhi, 2019 NY Slip Op. 31859(U), holding that when there is a question regarding whether a party signed an agreement containing an arbitration clause, the question of arbitrability is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide, explaining:

With respect to Om Vagzei LLC and Om Sidhdhy Vinayak LLC, amendment of the original operating agreements only required a majority of the LLC Interests to amend such operating agreements. Schedule A of the Original Om Vagzei Agreement indicated that Mr. Suratwala has no membership interest in that entity and the other petitioners Neha Suratwala and Trupti Saratwala, collectively, only had a 22% interest. Accordingly, even taking Mr. Surutwala’s forgery allegation as true and assuming that Neha Suratwala and Trupti Suratwala both did not consent to the amendment, there is no basis to stay the arbitration as it relates to Om Vagzei LLC or Om Sidhdhy Vinayak LLC because the petitioners have failed to allege a basis to find that the Amended and Restated Vagzei Agreement or the Amended and Restate Om Sidhdhy Agreement are not valid. In addition, with respect to Om Sidhdhy Vina yak LLC, Schedule A of the Original Om Sidhdhy Agreement does not indicate that Mr. Suratwala had a membership interest in that entity and none of the other petitioners are listed as members. Similarly, with respect to Om Viththal LLC, neither the Original Om Viththal Agreement, nor the Amended and Restated Om Viththal LLC Agreement list Mr. Tansukh Suratwala as a member. Accordingly, based on the submissions of the petitioners, there simply is no basis to understand how he has standing to challenge the Amended and Restated Viththal LLC Agreement. Furthermore, the Amended and Restated Om Viththal Agreement was signed by of the requisite 75% of its members so the consent of members holding 75% of the Membership Interests appears to have been met.

Finally, with respect to Aum Viththal LLC, Jai Ambe LLC, and Newberg Hotel Partners LLC, inasmuch as the Petitioners argue that the Aum Viththal Amended and Restated Agreement, the Jai Amended and Restated Agreement, and the Newberg Amended and Restated Agreement are invalid, at first blush, the petitioners’ application would seem to be governed by the United States Supreme Court analysis in Nitro-Lift Tech., LLC. v Howard (568 US 17 [2012]) and Prima Paint Corp. v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. (388 US 395 [1967]). In Nitro-Lift, the Court wrote:

attacks on the validity of the contract, as distinct from attacks on the validity of the arbitration clause itself, are to be resolved by the arbitrator in the first instance, not by a federal or state court (568 US at 20-21 [quotation and citation omitted]).

In Prima Paint, the Court held that claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally are to be determined by the arbitrator. The Court explained that, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself – an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate – the court may proceed to adjudicate it in the first instance.

However, a closer examination at the basis for the petitioners’ assertion that the Amended and Restated Agreements are invalid necessarily brings this case outside of this Prima Paint holding. The basis for the Court’s ruling in Prima Paint was that the arbitration clause was severable from the agreement at issue in that case. Unenforceability based on fraud in the factum is a question not squarely addressed by the Prima Paint Court. As the court in Kyung In Lee v Pacific Bullion (NY) Inc. (788 F Supp 155, 157 [ED NY 1992]) aptly observed:

if a party’s signature were forged on a contract, it would be absurd to require arbitration if the party attacking the contract as void failed to allege that the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently obtained. Therefore, arbitration is stayed solely with respect to Aum Viththal LLC, Jai Ambe LLC, and Newberg Hotel Partners LLC, and an evidentiary hearing is ordered to determine if the signature of Tansukh Suratwala on the Amended and Restated Agreements of those entities is a forgery, and the arbitration is stayed until such hearing occurs.

(Internal quotations omitted).

Commercial litigation involves more than courts. Disputes often are–by agreement–decided by private arbitrators. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have a question regarding a dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement.

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On June 27, 2019, Justice Scarpulla of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Kislev Partners, LLP v. Sidley LLP, 2019 NY Slip Op. 31850(U), declining to dismiss fraud claims as duplicative of a malpractice claim, explaining:

Sidley argues that plaintiffs’ claims all essentially sound in professional malpractice and, therefore, have a three-year statute of limitations, which passed long before this action was commenced. In their reply, Sidley elaborates: plaintiffs’ claims must be treated as malpractice claims for timeliness purposes even if a potential malpractice claim might fail on the merits. The malpractice limitations period applies whenever the facts underlying a party’s claims are of the sort properly pursued as malpractice, i.e., are based on an ‘alleged failure to exercise due care or abide by general professional standards.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that they have not pied a malpractice claim against Sidley, and that, instead, their claims are premised on intentional fraud, not simple professional negligence. Plaintiffs assert that their claims against Sidley cannot sound in malpractice because: 1) plaintiffs have never had an attorney client relationship with Sidley; (2) plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud each allege facts that go beyond legal malpractice and seek damages distinct from what is available for malpractice; and (3) plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim does not seek recovery of attorneys’ fees and is based on facts unrelated to legal representation.

In separating a malpractice claim from a fraud claim, the First Department, in Johnson v Proskauer Rose LLP (129 AD3d 59, 68 [1st Dept 2015]), recognized that a plaintiff may try to circumvent the three-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice by characterizing the defendants’ failure to meet professional standards as something else. In describing the distinction between a fraud claim and one for professional malpractice, the Court stated:

Thus, in Mitschele, the fraud claim was considered independent of the malpractice claim for statute of limitations purposes even though the harm arose out of the accountant’s failure to properly protect its client. The situation here is no different. Plaintiffs allege not only that defendants failed to adequately advise them with respect to the tax strategy. They also claim that Proskauer pressured them into the scheme because, at the outset, Proskauer’s paramount concern was preserving its lucrative arrangement with TDG, which presumably intended to continue to work with Proskauer to sell the scheme to other high net worth individuals and entities.

Like in Johnson v Proskauer Rose LLP, here plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims rely upon facts that go beyond professional negligence and include allegations that Sidley and the other defendants purposefully created and/or aided Valdez in creating an illegal scheme, which included the Opinion Letter, to market the allegedly criminal tax shelter to unwitting investors. Because plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims are not disguised claims for professional malpractice, the professional malpractice statute of limitations is inapplicable.

(Internal citations omitted).

We both bring and defend breach of fiduciary duty and professional malpractice claims and other claims relating to the duties of professionals such as lawyers, accountants and architects to their clients. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions regarding such claims or appeals of such claims.

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On June 28, 2019, Justice Cohen of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Town & Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Hearth at Mount Kisco, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op. 31862(U), holding that a company’s shareholders and directors could not be held liable for the company’s breach of its contractual obligations, explaining:

Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against HSC, FMK, and the Fortus Companies fail because they seek to impose liability against the Company’s stakeholders for contractual obligations borne solely by the Company. Corporations are legal entities distinct from their managers and shareholders and have an independent legal existence.

The Formation Agreement recognized the Company as a distinct legal entity capable of amassing its own powers, obligations, and assets separate from those of HSC, FMK, and the Fortus Companies.

The specific contractual violations alleged by Plaintiffs under the Formation Agreement go directly to the Company’s rights and responsibilities. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached Section 2.5 of the Formation Agreement by interfering with TCAL’s repurchase rights. But the repurchase right provides that TCAL may purchase the TCAL Property and the Lease, if not expired or terminated, and all Project Contracts and Project Approvals from the Company. Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached Section 4.3 of the Formation Agreement because having decided to acquire the Property, they failed to fulfill the obligations of the Lessee under the Ground Lease, including, but not limited to, the pursuit of site plan approval. But again, that part of the Formation Agreement concerns the obligations of the Company under the Lease, providing that if the Company makes the decision to acquire the Property, the Company agrees to fulfill the obligations of the Lessee as defined and set forth in the Lease.

Plaintiffs’ contract claims under the Fifth Amendment to the Ground Lease suffer from the same legal infirmity. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants breached Paragraph 7 of the Fifth Amendment because they failed to pay all real sic taxes that became due on 270 Kisco Ave even though it was Defendants’ responsibility to do so. That paragraph from the Fifth Amendment requires, among other things, that Tenant shall be responsible for payment of all outstanding real taxes for both the 53 Mountain Avenue and 270 Kisco Avenue properties to the date of closing. The key word there is Tenant, because under the Fifth Amendment, The Hearth at Mount Kisco, LLC assumed all obligations of Tenant hereunder and was the Tenant under the Lease. Thus, the Company-not HSC, FMK, or the Fortus Companies-agreed to accept the responsibilities that were allegedly flouted here.

In addition, HSC, FMK, and the Fortus Companies cannot be held liable for the company’s obligations by virtue of their status as a member thereof. Nor can these entities be held liable by virtue of their status as managers of the Company under New York Limited Liability Law §609: Neither a member of a limited liability company, nor a manager of a limited liability company managed by a manager or managers is liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the limited liability company or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or agent or acting (or omitting to act) in such capacities.

Broadly speaking, the law will disregard the corporate form in certain circumstances to prevent fraud or to achieve inequity. But to pierce the corporate veil or to establish an alter ego relationship, Plaintiffs must carry a heavy burden. In this case, Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to show that the privilege of conducting business in the corporate form was abused so as to warrant piercing the corporate veil to impose personal liability on the corporate officers.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ first, second, and third causes of action are dismissed as against HSC, FMK, and the Fortus Companies, but not as against the Company (which has not moved to dismiss those claims).

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

Usually, the only parties who have rights or obligations under a contract are the parties to the contract. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client face a situation where you are unsure whether you have rights or obligations under a contract.

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On July 2, 2019, the First Department issued a decision in Lantau Holdings Ltd. v. Orient Equal Intl. Group Ltd., 2019 NY Slip Op. 05328, holding that efforts to mitigate losses did not affirm a contract after it was breached, explaining:

The court correctly concluded that defendant did not affirm the contracts after discovering plaintiff’s breach. Defendant’s attempt to sell the non-conforming shares was not required by the contracts, but was an act in mitigation of its damages.

(Internal citations omitted).

Part of the reason parties to commercial contracts choose to have those contracts governed by New York law is that New York courts typically enforce contracts as written. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions regarding the breach of a contract under New York law.

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On July 2, 2019, the First Department issued a decision in Miami Capital, LLC v. Hurwitz, 2019 NY Slip Op. 05332, dismissing a legal malpractice claim for lack of allegations of damages, explaining:

Since damages in a legal malpractice case are designed to make the injured client whole, having failed to plead actual damages, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim.

(Internal citations omitted).

We both bring and defend professional malpractice claims and other claims relating to the duties of professionals such as lawyers, accountants and architects to their clients. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you have questions regarding such claims or appeals of such claims.

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On July 1, 2019, Justice Scarpulla of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Matter of PPDAI Group Sec. Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op. 51075(U), refusing to impose a PSLRA stay on a Securities Act action pending in the Commercial Division, explaining:

According to Moving Defendants, Plaintiffs should not be permitted to “skirt the PSLRA’s mandatory stay of discovery, which automatically stays all discovery until any motions to dismiss have been resolved.” Moving Defendants contend that the PSLRA’s discovery stay applies to all private actions including those in state court and that if Congress intended the stay to only apply to federal court actions, it would have said so.

Cyan did not address the applicability of the PSLRA’s automatic stay to state court ’33 Act cases. Nor do there appear to be any New York cases concerning this issue. States that have considered the relationship of the PSLRA discovery stay to state actions are divided.

Application of the federal PSLRA automatic discovery stay would undermine Cyan’s holding that ’33 Act cases may be heard in state courts. Accordingly, I am persuaded that the PSLRA’s automatic discovery stay is not applicable to an action brought in New York State court. Lastly, in the Commercial Division discovery generally continues during motion practice. I therefore decline to stay discovery in this action.

(Internal citations omitted).

We have substantial experience in litigation regarding securities, both in state and federal court. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client need help regarding a claim related to stocks, bonds or other financial instruments.

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On July 2, 2019, the First Department issued a decision in Matter of Steyn v. CRTV, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op. 05341, holding that an arbitrator did not manifestly disreagard the law in awarding a prevailing party attorneys’ fees, explaining:

We are mindful that courts possess very limited authority to review an arbitration award. Indeed, the parties agree that manifest disregard of the law is the only appropriate ground to vacate the arbitrator’s award of attorneys’ fees.

For an award to be set aside for manifest disregard, the arbitrator must understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same. Application of the manifest disregard of law standard requires the court to make, in essence, three inquiries: (1) whether the legal principle allegedly ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable; (2) whether the arbitrators knew of the governing legal principle; and, (3) whether knowing that principle, the arbitrators refused to apply it or ignored it. A court may not vacate an arbitration award because it thinks the arbitrators made the wrong decision. Indeed, even if the court thinks that the arbitrator reached the wrong result or applied the law incorrectly, the court should nevertheless confirm the award, despite the court’s disagreement with it on the merits, if there is a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached.

Whether manifest disregard of the law occurred here depends on whether New York law on attorneys’ fees controlled the arbitration. It is well established under New York procedural rules and substantive law that arbitrators are not permitted to award attorneys’ fees in arbitration. New York courts only recognize three limited exceptions to New York’s special arbitration provision barring the award of attorneys’ fees: (1) where a statute provides for such an award, (2) where it was authorized by an express provision in the agreement; or (3) where it is unmistakably clear that both parties intended such an award.

In this case, Supreme Court found that the arbitrator was neither authorized to award attorneys’ fees by statute (first exception), nor by the parties’ agreement (second exception), but concluded that the third exception might apply. Supreme Court found, however, that it was not unmistakably clear that the parties intended that attorneys’ fees be awarded. Specifically, relying on this Court’s precedent, Supreme Court found that the parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees, in their respective pleadings, constituted mere boilerplate requests that did not satisfy an unmistakably clear intent to agree that attorneys’ fees be awarded.

We find, however, that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law because it was not unreasonable for the arbitrator to conclude that the unmistakably clear intent requirement did not apply. It appears that the arbitrator believed the requirement did not apply because here the parties’ arbitration clause incorporated the rules of the AAA as controlling, and Rule 47(d) of the AAA explicitly provides that an award of attorneys’ fees may be made if all parties have requested such an award or it is authorized by law or the arbitration agreement. Rule 47(d) of the AAA does not require any specific language to be used in making a request for attorneys’ fees. Thus, under Rule 47(d) of the AAA, an arbitrator would be empowered to award attorneys’ fees provided, as here, all parties have requested it even if the unmistakably clear standard for requesting attorneys’ fees under New York law was not met.

The arbitrator’s conclusion under the AAA rules that a party may receive attorneys’ fees, although not otherwise entitled to attorneys’ fees under New York’s unmistakably clear standard, was not unreasonable. Therefore, it cannot be overturned by this Court under the manifest disregard of the law standard. In fact, there is support for the arbitrator’s conclusion in this Court’s prior holdings. We have held that the power to award attorneys’ fees can arise from the submission of the dispute under the rules of a given organization, like the AAA, if the rules themselves authorize the fees. For example, in Matter of Warner Bros. Records, this Court upheld the arbitrators’ award of attorneys’ fees because the arbitration in question was governed by the AAA, which permits an award of attorney fees and where, like here, both parties so requested it in their respective pleadings.

Even if this Court were of the view that the AAA rules did not grant the arbitrator broader authority to award attorneys’ fees than New York’s unmistakably clear standard, that the arbitrator gave the AAA Rule 47(a) a broader interpretation does not evidence a manifest disregard of the law. Indeed, this Court previously held in McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel Sec., Inc. v Ferrucci (67 AD3d at 405) that an arbitrator’s award of attorneys’ fees was not a manifest disregard of the law, even though the parties’ agreement was governed by New York law, because it did not appear that the arbitrators knew that New York law was controlling on the question of their authority to award attorneys’ fees. Similarly, here, just as Supreme Court initially held before changing its decision upon reargument, the arbitrator was under the impression that it is possible under the AAA rules for a party not otherwise entitled to attorneys’ fees under New York’s unmistakably clear intent standard, to be entitled to such fees under the AAA rules. This was a reasonable interpretation not based on manifest disregard of the law, and thus should not be vacated.

Finally, contrary to CRTV’s argument, a New York choice of law provision in the agreement to arbitrate, without greater specificity, does not bar damages permitted under the FAA and AAA rules, but barred by New York law. For example, an arbitrator is empowered to award punitive damages, in accordance with FAA rules, despite the fact that a contract contains a New York choice of law provision and punitive damages would be precluded under New York law. This Court has recognized that the FAA has a preemptive effect on New York’s restrictions on arbitral awards of punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. Thus, although attorneys’ fees are generally barred under New York law, pursuant to the “American Rule,” they are not barred in arbitration when the agreement contains a New York choice of law provision.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

Commercial litigation involves more than courts. Disputes often are–usually by agreement but sometimes by statute–decided by private arbitrators. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have a question regarding a dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement or law.

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On June 17, 2019, Justice Borrok of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Fisher v. Lewis Constr. NYC, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op. 31775(U), holding that a corporate defendant’s mail delivery problems were not a basis for vacating a default judgment, explaining:

Under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a court may relieve a party from a judgment or order where there is an excusable default provided that a motion to set aside or vacate is made within one year after service of the judgment or order on the moving party. A party seeking relief from a default judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015(a)(1) must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious claim or defense to the action. Relief is not appropriate where there is evidence of dilatory or otherwise intentional behavior suggesting that the default was willful or contumacious.

Here, Ms. Fisher has submitted affidavits of service of the summons and complaint, the notice of motion for default judgment, the decision and order, and the notice of entry. An affidavit of service in accordance with CPLR § 302 is prima facie evidence of proper service. A conclusory denial of service is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service to which an affidavit of service is entitled. Although Lewis Construction denies receiving service of the summons and complaint, it does not deny receiving all of the other notices served by Ms. Fisher in this action, and in any event, its denials are bare and conclusory.

Lewis Construction acknowledges that it was aware of the pending action but denies that it had any obligation to file an answer or appear because it alleges that it never received a copy of the summons and complaint from the Secretary of State. This argument is misguided, however, because service of process on a corporation is deemed complete when the Secretary of State is served, regardless of whether service is subsequently received by the corporate defendant. Ms. Fisher has submitted an affidavit of service of process on the Secretary of State pursuant to CPLR § 306 demonstrating that Lewis Construction was properly served. Therefore, service was proper in this case and Lewis Construction, with knowledge that the action had been commenced, intentionally failed to file an answer or appear.

Lewis Construction argues that its neglect in failing to file an answer or otherwise appear in this matter is excusable because it does not have a great system for receiving mail at its business address. This argument is unavailing. Lewis Construction acknowledges that it has been aware for several years that it could not reliably receive mail at the address that it maintains for its general contractor’s license and that it holds out to the public as its business address. But it also states that the building has a doorman and a porter, and that any mail received is either given directly to Lewis Construction’s President and CEO’s mother, who lives in the building and maintains a medical office on the first floor, is left at the door of the apartment or the medical office, or is placed on top of the building’s mailboxes. Under these circumstances, Lewis Construction’s failure to occasionally check for mail falls short of excusable neglect. Therefore, Lewis Construction is not entitled to vacatur of the default judgment under CPLR § 5015(a)(1).

Lewis Construction also seeks to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR § 317. To establish entitlement to relief under CPLR § 317, a defendant must show that (i) the defendant was served by a method other than personal delivery, (ii) the movant did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend, (iii) there is a meritorious defense, and (iv) the motion is made within one year of the receipt of knowledge of the entry of judgment, and not more than five years from the entry of judgment.

Where a party’s attorneys are aware that an action has been commenced and engage in active negotiations prior to the filing of a motion for default judgment, the party has actual notice and is not entitled to relief from the default judgment under CPLR § 317. In this case, Lewis Construction acknowledges that it had actual notice of the action as early as October 23, 2018, when its counsel, with whom Ms. Fisher had been actively engaged in negotiations regarding this matter, received a copy of the summons and complaint. Lewis Construction also does not deny that it received the numerous subsequent notices served on it by Ms. Fisher, which would have apprised it of the pendency of this action. As Lewis Construction had actual notice of the action in time to defend and failed to answer or otherwise appear, Lewis Construction is not entitled to relief under CPLR § 317.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

The rules regarding how you start a lawsuit and bring the defendants into it can sometimes be esoteric. As shown here, if a process server claims in a sworn affidavit that you were served, you have to overcome that presumption with more than bare denials or claims of mistakes in dealing with mail delivery. Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have a question regarding the proper way to serve a defendant, bringing them into a lawsuit.

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On June 26, 2019, the Second Department issued a decision in Magee-Boyle v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op. 05118, holding that policy notices submitted by the defendant insurer were not documentary evidence sufficient to support a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1), explaining:

Moreover, that branch of Reliastar’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) should have been denied. To succeed on a motion to dismiss based upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the documentary evidence must utterly refute the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law. In order for evidence to qualify as documentary, it must be unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable. Judicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case. Conversely, letters, emails, and affidavits fail to meet the requirements for documentary evidence. Here, in support of that branch of its motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), Reliastar submitted the policy and certain policy notices, which, according to Reliastar, refuted the plaintiffs’ contention that the policy cancellation was the result of Reliastar’s breach of its obligations under the policy. The policy notices, however, were, in effect, letters, which fail to meet the requirements for documentary evidence within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(1). Under the circumstances, Reliastar did not conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law or utterly refute the plaintiffs’ factual allegations.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

This decision relates to the New York procedural rules allowing a claim to be dismissed if it is refuted by documentary evidence (CPLR 3211(a)(1)). As this decision notes, documentary evidence does not mean just any kind of document. Many cases have held that the law is “fuzzy” on when a document can be used as documentary evidence under 3211(a)(1). Contact Schlam Stone & Dolan partner John Lundin at jlundin@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions regarding whether a claim against you can be refuted at the pleadings stage by documentary evidence.

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