Court Denies Post-Trial Motion To Set Aside Jury’s Verdict

Posted: June 18, 2025 / Written by: Jeffrey M. Eilender, Thomas A. Kissane, Samuel L. Butt, Joshua Wurtzel, Channing J. Turner / Category Commercial

Court Denies Post-Trial Motion To Set Aside Jury’s Verdict

On May 14, 2025, Justice Joel M. Cohen denied Defendant’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict or for a new trial in Iken v. Bohemian Brethren Presbyterian Church, Index No. 654614/2017. The Court explained:

The “setting aside of a jury verdict as a matter of law and the setting aside of a jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence involve two inquiries and two different standards” (Loretta v Split Dev. Corp., 168 AD3d 823, 825 [2d Dept 2019] [citation omitted]). “A motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law ‘will be granted where there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusions reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial’. A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence ‘unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence’” (id. [internal citation omitted]).

Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ evidence of lost profits was insufficient as a matter of law is unavailing. Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could have led a rational jury to conclude that Plaintiffs were entitled to lost profits in the amount awarded. The jury could, for example, have credited the testimony from Ms. Iken that in order to agree to enter into the lease agreement, Defendant demanded a business plan with profit forecasts, that she provided Defendant with her business plan created by a CPA based on the financial performance of a preschool that had a 40-year track record in the very space to be occupied by Plaintiff’s proposed school (see JX-54). Furthermore, the evidence indicated that for the one year that Plaintiffs operated, Plaintiffs made the approximate profits projected by the business plan, which Plaintiffs were able to carry over into the next years for operations (see NYSCEF 176 at 295:23-25 – 296:1-2 [when asked how much money did she carry over into 2017 after operating for that first year, Ms. Iken testified “[i]t was about, I would say, somewhere in the $200,000 range”]; JX-77, showing over $241,000 in payments for operations after January 1, 2017). Thus, unlike what might otherwise be deemed a speculative claim by a start-up business for lost profits, here there was identifiable past performance combined with some indicia of future success (see e.g., Greasy Spoon, Inc. v Jefferson Towers, Inc., 75 NY2d 792, 795 [1990]).

Accordingly, the jury was within its province to determine that Plaintiffs were entitled to lost profits for the approximately three years left in which it was not able to operate. It was therefore not irrational for the jury to reach an award of $734,353, which falls in the range between 2-3 years of lost profit (see JX-54 [breaking down projected profits by year]). The law does not require that lost profits be determined with mathematical precision (see Ashland Mgt. v Janien, 82 NY2d 395, 403 [1993] [“Damages resulting from the loss of future profits are often an approximation. The law does not require that they be determined with mathematical precision”]). In sum, the Court cannot conclude “that ‘there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial’” (Rivera v 4064 Realty Co., 17 AD3d 201, 202–203 [1st Dept 2005] [citation omitted]).

For the same reasons, Defendant’s argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is unpersuasive.

Contact the Commercial Division Blog Committee at commercialdivisionblog@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions concerning a motion to set aside a jury verdict