Forbearance Agreement Did Not Transform Guaranty Into An Instrument Outside The Scope Of CPLR 3213

Posted: January 28, 2026 / Written by: Samuel L. Butt, Joshua Wurtzel, Channing J. Turner, Thomas A. Kissane / Categories Commercial, Guaranty , Summary Judgment

Forbearance Agreement Did Not Transform Guaranty Into An Instrument Outside The Scope Of CPLR 3213

On December 23, 2025, in Truist Equipment Finance Corp. v. Tebele, Index No. 653557/2025, Justice Joel M. Cohen granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint. Defendant argued that the Guaranty at issue was not an instrument for payment of money only because plaintiff and defendant entered into a forbearance agreement. The Court rejected this argument, explaining:

Mr. Tebele further argues that the Guaranty is not an instrument for the payment of money only because Truist and Mr. Tebele entered into a forbearance agreement pursuant to which Truist agreed to temporarily forbear from exercising its rights and remedies under the Guaranty (see NYSCEF 8 [“Forbearance Agreement”]; Memo Opp at 13-14). However, the existence of a related agreement, standing alone, does not preclude application of CPLR 3213, provided the defendant’s unconditional obligation to make payment is apparent from the guaranty itself (see Embraer Finance Ltd v Servicios Aereos Profesionales, S.A., 42 AD3d 380, 381 [1st Dept 2007]; PFNGT LLC v Liquid Capital LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 31518(U) [Sup Ct, NY County 2025]; GLD Legacy Holdings, LLC v Legacy Educ. Alliance, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 32601(U) at 16 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [Crane J] [“The court rejects [the defendant’s] argument that the need to refer to the Forbearance Agreement renders CPLR 3213 inapplicable. The Forbearance Agreement merely provides the mechanism for enforcing the [instrument for the payment of money only] and does not […] alter the [instrument’s] terms or monetary nature”]).1

Here, the Forbearance Agreement (which terminated on or around April 30, 2025, Kolody Aff ¶¶ 54-57) simply deferred Mr. Tebele’s obligations under the Guaranty; it did not transform the Guaranty into an instrument outside the scope of CPLR 3213. Accordingly, Mr.Tebele’s argument fails, and Truist has established a prima facie case under CPLR 3213.

In footnote 1, the Court further noted:

As the Court noted at oral argument, accepting Mr. Tebele’s argument that a forbearance agreement effectively forecloses access to CPLR 3213 would create a potentially significant disincentive for lenders to sign such agreements, which are a useful and common way to forestall or eliminate the need for litigation. There is no support in the statute or the case law for such a result.

Contact the Commercial Division Blog Committee at commercialdivisionblog@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions concerning summary judgment in lieu of complaint.