Commercial Division Blog

Motion To Vacate Civil Arrest Warrant Granted, Damages For Contempt Referred For Hearing

Posted: July 30, 2025 / Written by: Jeffrey M. Eilender, Thomas A. Kissane, Samuel L. Butt, Joshua Wurtzel, Channing J. Turner / Categories Contempt, Attorney Fees

Motion To Vacate Civil Arrest Warrant Granted, Damages For Contempt Referred For Hearing

On June 29, 2025, Justice Andrea Masley granted a contemnor’s motion to vacate a civil arrest warrant and set the damages caused by contemnor’s late compliance down for hearing.  The case is Satterfield v.  VStock Transfer, LLC, Index No. 650311/2019.

In 2021, Justice Masley had confirmed an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff Brent Satterfield and ordered defendant Val Sklarov and various defendant companies that Sklarov controlled to return to Satterfield two tranches of stock.  By order entered May 2, 2022, the court held Sklarov and his defendant companies in contempt for failure to comply with that order and directed that a civil arrest warrant issue for Sklarov if defendants failed to purge the contempt.  Slip op., pp. 2-3. 

A civil arrest warrant issued on June 2, 2022, and defendants did not appeal it.  In 2025, Sklarov moved to vacate the civil arrest warrant on the ground that he had complied with the May 2, 2022 order by returning one of the stock tranches in 2022 and the other by February 2025.  Satterfield opposed and cross-moved for damages caused by diminution in the value of the stock tranches between the dates they should have been returned and the later dates they were returned, and for attorneys’ fees and costs arising from the contempt proceedings. 

Justice Masley granted Sklarov’s motion to vacate the warrant because “incarceration, if any, would be coercive in nature” and, as Satterfield had acknowledged return of shares, there was no further need to coerce his Sklarov’s compliance.  Slip op., p. 4.

Satterfield was entitled to damages from diminution caused by late transfer of the two traches of stock, because “[s]ubsequent obedience does not discharge liability for previous disobedience”.  Slip op., p. 5 (internal citation omitted).  The court referred the damages determination to a judicial hearing officer or referee because Satterfield’s submission failed to substantiate the dates on which the stock transfers could first have been accomplished. Id., pp. 5-7. 

The court denied Satterfield’s cross-motion for attorneys’ fees and costs arising from the contempt: “As the court is awarding Satterfield recovery for actual loss caused by Sklarov’s contempt, attorneys’ fees and expenses are unavailable. (Judiciary Law § 773.)” Slip op., p. 7 (collecting cases.)  

Contact the Commercial Division Blog Committee at commercialdivisionblog@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions concerning contempt or attorneys’ fees.