Commercial Division Blog
Court Sustains Financial Advisor’s Claim Under Contract Calling for 40% of Fees Client Paid Its Advisors on an Identified Transaction, Without Deciding Whether Client Was Obliged to Engage the Advisor on That Transaction
Posted: November 16, 2026 / Written by: Thomas A. Kissane / Categories Breach of Contract, Contract Interpretation, Indemnification and Advancement, Motion to Dismiss
Court Sustains Financial Advisor’s Claim Under Contract Calling for 40% of Fees Client Paid Its Advisors on an Identified Transaction, Without Deciding Whether Client Was Obliged to Engage the Advisor on That Transaction
On October 8, 2026, Justice Andrea Masley of the New York County Commercial Division held that a financial advisor’s claim for a contractual payment equal to 40% of the total fees the client paid its financial advisors on an identified transaction that had not yet occurred when the parties signed the engagement letter was not barred as an unenforceable agreement to agree. The case is Perella Weinberg Partners LP v. Aspen Technology, Inc., Index No. 655294/2025.
Perella Weinberg Partners LP (“PWP”) alleged that Aspen Technology, Inc. (“AspenTech”) breached their engagement letter by i) failing to i) engage PWP on a later transaction with Emerson Electric Co. (“EEC”), ii) pay the minimum fee described below, and iii) indemnify PWP for its fees incurred in suing.
The engagement letter provided that, if AspenTech pursued the EEC transaction, it would engage PWP on terms to be set in a separate agreement and that PWP would “under no circumstances” be paid less than 40% of the total fees AspenTech paid its financial advisors on that transaction.
AspenTech moved to dismiss under C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(1) and (7), arguing that the fee clause was an unenforceable agreement to agree. The Court rejected that argument, explaining:
The Engagement Letter does contemplate further negotiations, but those negotiations concern the terms of PWP’s transaction-specific engagement and the amount of the ultimate Transaction Fee. (Id.) The minimum fee, by contrast, is expressly set forth in Section 2(b) and does not depend on the parties reaching a further agreement as to its amount. (Id.) Thus, the fact that certain terms remained to be negotiated in a future agreement does not erase or undermine the minimum-payment obligation that the parties had already agreed to in the existing Engagement Letter Agreement.
Slip op., pp. 6-7 (citation omitted).
Citing Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), which held that a controller buyout does not receive business judgment deference unless, among other things, the special committee is “empowered to freely select its own advisors”, AspenTech argued that the engagement letter could not bind its special committee to retain PWP. The Court found that Kahn did not defeat the payment obligation: whether the committee could be required to engage PWP was “a different question from whether AspenTech remains bound by the payment terms of the Engagement Letter” and the minimum-payment obligation “is tied to the Company’s payment of advisory fees, not to PWP’s engagement by the Special Committee.” Slip op., pp. 8-9.
The minimum fee was sufficiently definite because it could be calculated objectively, id., pp. 7-8, and the Statute of Frauds did not bar the claim because the written engagement letter contains the payment obligation. Id., pp. 10-11. It dismissed PWP’s indemnification claim because the indemnification language did not meet the “unmistakably clear” standard that applies where a party seeks to apply such language to cover attorneys’ fees incurred in litigation between the contracting parties. Id., pp. 12-13 (citing Sage Sys., Inc. v. Liss, 39 N.Y.3d 27, 32-33 (2022).
Contact the Commercial Division Blog Committee at commercialdivisionblog@schlamstone.com if you or a client have questions concerning enforcement of financial advisor engagement letters or fee-shifting under indemnification provisions.