In an April 4, 2014 judgment and order in Jiaxing Globillion Import and Export Co. v. Argington, Inc., 11 CV 6291 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2014), Judge Jack B. Weinstein granted summary judgment for plaintiff and pierced the corporate veil to hold one of the corporate defendant’s two shareholders liable for the company’s breach of contract. Plaintiff Jiaxing Globallion Import and Export Co. (“JG”) entered into a contract with Argington, Inc., to supply children’s furniture and furniture parts for a contract price of nearly $900,000, and delivered the goods in 28 shipments between 2009 and 2011. Argington paid only for a portion of the shipments, and earlier in the case a default judgment was entered against it for $672,905. Judge Weinstein had little trouble granting JG’s summary judgment motion on its claim to pierce the corporate veil, which under governing Missouri law had to be pled as a distinct cause of action. The two shareholders were husband and wife and made all decisions for the company. They observed no corporate formalities, comingling funds and using corporate funds for their personal expenses, including purchases at Costco, Crate and Barrel, Home Depot, IKEA, Prospect Park Tennis and elsewhere. They failed to declare as income the personal expenses the corporation paid for them. As a result of the company’s payment of the shareholders’ personal expenses, the company became undercapitalized. Between 2009 and 2012 the company’s debt to vendors went from 0 to $558,000, but instead of paying their vendors the shareholders disbursed $554,000 from the corporation to themselves. They also disbursed to themselves $193,000 in loans. In his decision Judge Weinstein did not report that there was any countervailing evidence.
On April 14, 2014, the Second Circuit issued a decision in United States v. Doe, Docket No. 14-572, dismissing an appeal from “an oral order of the” EDNY “granting the government’s motion for a protective order that would allow proffer statements made by” defendant Doe “to be disclosed to his codefendants” because the order was not appealable.
The Second Circuit determined that the EDNY’s discovery order was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine, notwithstanding the circumstances of the disclosure ordered, explaining:
Typically, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal until the district court renders a final judgment. Doe, however, argues his appeal properly brought pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, or as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The collateral order doctrine permits an appeal of a small class of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed final. Only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment the underlying action fall within this exception to the rule of finality. In making this determination, we do not engage in an individualized jurisdictional inquiry. Rather, our focus is on the entire category to which a claim belongs. The policy embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is at its strongest in the field of criminal law. As Doe’s counsel concedes, disclosure of these proffer statements is a routine practice; we therefore cannot conclude that the entire category, of orders sanctioning the disclosure of proffer statements raises issues of such importance as to justify an exception to the final judgment rule. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear Doe’s appeal.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court went on, however, to note that its
disposition does not endorse the district court’s decision, nor limit the ability of the court to reconsider its order, including giving further consideration to the advisability of more restrictive conditions on the government’s proposed disclosures
and to discuss alternatives to the proposed disclosure.
On April 2, 2014, the Second Circuit issued a decision in United States ex rel. Maurice Keshner v. Nursing Personnel Home Care, Docket Nos. 13-1688-cv (Lead), 14-251-cv (Con), addressing the question of when the time to appeal non-final fee awards begins to run.
In Keshner, the Second Circuit addressed a motion to dismiss an appeal from an order issued by the EDNY awarding a qui tam plaintiff attorney’s fees because the appeal had been filed more than 60 days after the initial decision granting the fees was issued. The Court held that a “fee award, entered before entry of a final judgment or a partial judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not have to be appealed until entry of an appealable judgment.” It explained that:
because the fee award against [the appealing defendant] was a collateral order in a case that remained pending because of open claims against other defendants, the entry of the fee award did not trigger [the defendant’s] obligation to file a notice of appeal. Failure to take an available collateral order appeal does not forfeit the right to review the order on appeal from a final judgment. Indeed, we would not expect an appellate court to require an interlocutory appeal of a pre-judgment or pre-final order fee award because review of a fee award would normally be intertwined with the merits of an appeal from a final judgment or final order. Of course, once the District Court in the pending case entered a partial judgment under Rule 54(b), the time to appeal that judgment began upon its entry.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).
This decision adds clarity to what can be the confusing question of whether/when interlocutory appeals need be taken under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Keshner Court noted that four months ago, in Perez v. AC Roosevelt Food Corp., 734 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2013), amended, No. 13-497, 2013 WL 6439381 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2013), the Second Circuit reached a different conclusion on different facts, so in assessing the question of when/whether to appeal a non-final order awarding attorney’s fees, one might want to consult Perez as well as Keshner.
In Knox v. Countrywide Bank, 13 CV 3789 (JFB)(WDW) (E.D.N.Y. March 12, 2014), homeowners who took out first and second home mortgage loans from Countrywide sued the bank and others on two fraud theories. The first theory alleged that Countrywide had concealed that the note underlying the mortgage was invalid because the mortgage was held in the name of defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”), an agent of the mortgagee, and was therefore “split” from the underlying note signed by defendant Countrywide. Plaintiffs’ second theory was that Countrywide caused the homeowners to inflate their income on a loan application in order to obtain the loan. Judge Joseph F. Bianco dismissed the fraud claims. With respect to the “splitting” of the mortgage from the underlying note, the Court, citing a New York Appellate Division, Second Department decision , held that plaintiffs had it backwards: the mortgage is unenforceable apart from its underlying note, but the note remains enforceable apart from its mortgage. This dashed plaintiffs’ hopes of using the controversial MERS system (of registering mortgages in the name of an agent so that they could be more easily assigned among lenders) as a basis to get out from under their debt. Since Countrywide held the underlying note, the note was enforceable and there could be no fraud claim. With respect to the inflated income on the loan application, plaintiffs claimed that even though they informed Countrywide that their income was lower than that stated on the form, Countrywide took advantage of plaintiffs’ “severe financial stress” and caused them to submit it anyway. Id. at 7. The Court rejected that theory as well, holding “Plaintiffs’ financial situation does not convert their knowing submission of false information into a cause of action for fraud against Countrywide.” Id. The second fraud theory was dismissed because plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied “on a lender’s misstatement of one’s own income, which one knows to be false.” Id. The Court went on to uphold plaintiffs’ statutory claim for quiet title under Article 15 of the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, the only claim to survive the dismissal motion.
On March 27, 2014, the Second Circuit issued a decision in DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 12-4867-cv, discussing the standard for determining whether a post-bankruptcy-discharge lawsuit can be brought based on pre-discharge claims.
In DPWN Holdings, the EDNY denied the defendants’ motion to “dismiss an antitrust price-fixing claim,” rejecting the defendants’ argument that “the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the availability of the claim against a Chapter 11 debtor to satisfy due process requirements and render the claim discharged.” The Second Circuit reversed, explaining that: (more…)
On March 11, 2014, the Second Circuit issued a decision in Donachie v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. et al., Nos. 12-2996-CV (Lead), 12-3031 (XAP), clarifying “the scope of a district court’s discretion in deciding whether to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing” ERISA plaintiff.
In Donachie, the EDNY granted the plaintiff summary judgment “on his claim for long-term disability benefits pursuant to ERISA,” but denied the “plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees, based on the conclusion that defendant did not act in bad faith.” The Second Circuit reversed the denial of an award of attorneys’ fees, explaining:
[A] district court’s discretion to award attorneys’ fees under ERISA is not unlimited, inasmuch as it may only award attorneys’ fees to a beneficiary who has obtained some degree of success on the merits. . . . [W]hether a plaintiff has obtained some degree of success on the merits is the sole factor that a court must consider in exercising its discretion. Although a court may, without further inquiry, award attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff who has had some degree of success on the merits, . . . courts retain discretion to consider five additional factors in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees. Those five factors, known in this Circuit as the Chambless factors are:
(1) the degree of opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees against the opposing parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.
. . .
[However,] if a court chooses to consider factors other than a plaintiff’s success on the merits in assessing a request for attorneys’ fees, Chambless still provides the relevant framework in this Circuit, and courts must deploy that useful framework in a manner consistent with our case law. A court cannot selectively consider some factors while ignoring others.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted) (bold emphasis added).
Because the district court “misapplied” the Chambless “framework,” the Second Circuit found that it had abused its discretion and, on performing the analysis itself, found no reason to deny an award and remanded the case to the district court for an award of reasonable fees.
In a March 11, 2014, summary order, the Second Circuit (Katzmann, C.C.J., Sack, C.J., and Rakoff, D.J.) vacated an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the Americans With Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). The court also remanded and reassigned the case because Eastern District Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. had conducted his own investigation of the premises at issue and determined that plaintiff’s counsel had not succeeded in remedying the ADA violations—and therefore was not deserving of attorneys’ fees.
The seemingly sui generis case is Costello v. Flatman LLC, No. 13-1446 (Mar. 11, 2014). The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant for violations of the ADA and moved for attorneys’ fees as provided in the statute. The district judge visited each of the businesses identified in the plaintiff’s eight lawsuits, and took judicial notice that the “‘alleged structural deficiencies preventing access to persons with disabilities still exist.'” Slip Op. at 3 (quoting district court). Based on those observations, the district court concluded that plaintiff’s counsel “never sought to remedy these failings” and consequently that he should receive no attorneys’ fees. Id. In vacating and remanding, the Circuit explained that structural defects in the buildings that prevented access to the disabled did not represent the kind of fact appropriate for judicial notice because “it is not clear” that such defects are “not subject to reasonable dispute” or that the district court’s conclusions could be “readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id. The Panel also granted the plaintiff’s request that on remand the case be assigned to another judge, given “the district court’s error in conducting its own investigation of the restaurants and taking judicial notice of its findings.” Id. at 4. The Court did not question the district judge’s impartiality, but said he would likely have difficulty on remand putting his own findings out of his mind.
The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, which divests federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, is generally well-known. But the Witness Security Reform Act of 1984 (the “Program Statute”), which deals with the federal witness protection program, creates a rare exception to the exception by expressly creating a right of action for domestic relations matters in federal courts where the Program Statute applies.
In Garmhausen v. Corridan, 07-CV-2565 (ARR)(LB) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014), Judge Allyne R. Ross had to decide whether a child custody dispute involving a parent who had left protective custody would nevertheless benefit from the Program Statute’s federal right of action. Plaintiff, the father of the child at issue, argued that the Program Statute no longer applied once the mother left protective custody, and therefore the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The government, appearing on behalf of the mother, argued that the court had jurisdiction–even though the mother had been removed from the witness protection program—because the terms of the Program Statute continued to apply. According to Judge Ross, this was a matter of first impression.
The statute makes itself applicable “to any person provided protection” under the program. The government argued that “once someone is ‘provided’ protection, their lives change in immeasurable ways—e.g., new identities, cessation of communication with loved ones, removal to a new state—and they do not typically revert to their former identities or lives when any physical protection ends.” Id. at 5. In essence, the government’s position was that the court retained jurisdiction because once a witness is in the program, he or she never leaves. Judge Ross agreed, finding as a policy matter that it was important to extend the Program Statute’s protections “because of the ongoing relationship that continues in place between Corridan and the Program.”
In U.S. v. Finazzo, 10-CR-457 (RRM)(RML) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014), Judge Roslynn Mauskopf denied three post-trial motions by Defendant Christopher Finazzo: (1) for judgment of acquittal (under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29); (2) to vacate the judgment (under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33); and (3) to arrest the judgment (under Fed. R. Crim. P. 34).
Finazzo was an executive at the clothing retailer Aeropostale who was accused of funneling some of Aeropostale’s graphic t-shirt business to a vendor (“South Bay”) that gave him kickbacks by sharing its profits from the referred business. According to the government, Aeropostale lost profits because it could have paid less to other suppliers if Finazzo had not improperly diverted the accounts to South Bay, in which he owned an undisclosed interest. Interestingly, Aeropostale discovered the fraud during a separate investigation into Finazzo’s conduct, when it uncovered an email from Finazzo’s personal attorney that referred to a list of assets in his “revised wills” that included his interest in South Bay.
After trial, Finazzo challenged his convictions on over a dozen counts of mail and wire fraud. He essentially claimed that the government had failed to offer “solid proof of the actual, identifiable, monetarily better deal” Aeropostale could have gotten elsewhere. Op. at 27. Judge Mauskopf rejected that argument. She held that the applicable mail and wire fraud statutes did not impose such a requirement, and even if they did, there was evidence introduced at trial sufficient to show that the company would have paid lower prices for t-shirts from other vendors.
In The Gowanus Dredgers v. Baard, 11 CV 5985 (PKC) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013), the Gowanus Dredgers (the “Dredgers”), a charitable organization established “to raise awareness of environmental issues affecting the Gowanus waterfront in Brooklyn and the broader New York/New Jersey harbor area,” sued Erik Baard, the founder of a group called the Long Island City Community Boathouse (“Boathouse”) that later became affiliated with the Dredgers. After Baard resigned from the leadership of both the Dredgers and the Boathouse, he allegedly continued to use the logo and name of the Boathouse on his Facebook page. As a result, the Dredgers sued Baard for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, common law unfair competition, and New York’s unfair competition laws.
In deciding the Dredgers’ motion for summary judgment, Judge Pamela Chen addressed whether they had standing to assert infringement claims owned by the Boathouse, which used (and therefore owned) the trademark at issue. The Dredgers argued that they owned the Boathouse’s trademark because: (1) the Boathouse was “essentially a subsidiary” of the Dredgers; (2) the Boathouse was an “activity committee” of the Dredgers governed by the Dredgers’ by-laws; (3) the Dredgers provided insurance to the Boathouse; and (4) the Boathouse operated as a “fiscal conduit” for fundraising for the Dredgers. Baard countered by arguing that the Boathouse was a separate entity from the Dredgers, therefore they did not have standing to assert the infringement claims at issue.
Judge Chen found that issues of fact concerning the Dredgers’ ownership of the Boathouse precluded summary judgment. She was not persuaded that the purchase of insurance coverage or the alleged “fiscal conduit” relationship constituted evidence of ownership. What she found “most telling” was the absence of a contract, board minutes, correspondence, or an authorization evidencing the Dredgers’ ownership of the Boathouse. After oral argument she gave the Dredgers the opportunity to submit an affidavit supplementing their claim of ownership, and the Dredgers did so. However, the affidavit did not definitively resolve the ownership question and left issues of fact.